When Inflation is More than a Fiscal Phenomenon: Brazil and the URV
Abstract
The traditional view holds that a credible fiscal reform eliminating the government's reliance on seigniorage is necessary and sufficient to end hyperinflation (Sargent, 1982). Yet stabilizations typically need an additional coordination device to succeed, such as an exchange rate peg. Brazil's 1994 Real Plan offers a striking example. Inflation continued to rise after the fiscal reform and collapsed only after the introduction of the URV, a coordination device. This paper explains why stabilization may fail even when it is fiscally feasible and how a coordination device solves the problem. To achieve that, I build an analytical flexible-price model in which incomplete common knowledge and strategic complementarities can prevent firms from coordinating during a monetary regime change. A coordination device solves this problem by allowing firms to set their real prices without having to forecast other firms' nominal prices. Using a quantitative menu-cost model, I show that coordination devices substantially reduce the output cost of stabilization, with the URV generating smaller losses than an exchange rate peg when a fiscal reform is already in place.